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The structure of international trade is increasingly characterized by fragmentation of
production processes and trade policy. Yet, how trade policy affects supply-chain trade
is largely unexplored territory. This paper shows how 10 Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) accession to the European Union (EU) affected European supply-
chain trade. We find that accession primarily fostered CEECs’ integration in value
chains of other entrants, not incumbents. Upgrading dynamics in terms of more skill-
intensive production are also driven by intra-CEEC integration. Smaller integration
benefits stem for East-West trade in services for low-skill activities. These increases
in value added exports translate into job creation.
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1 Introduction
International fragmentation of production processes is changing the nature of international
trade. Well-known case studies on the consumer electronics and the automobile indus-
tries illustrate that countries and industries are interconnected through Global Value Chains
(GVCs), in which every country contributes specialized (intermediate) goods and services
(Dudenhöffer, 2005; Baldwin, 2006; Dedrick et al., 2010). Several novel datasets on trade
in value added have recently been made available, enabling research in international trade
policy to move beyond conventional gross trade statistics (see, e.g., Johnson and Noguera,
2012a; Koopman et al., 2014; Timmer et al., 2015).
By now, a large literature deals with the question how trade liberalization and the as-
sociated decrease in trade costs affects a country’s exports, which ultimately refers to the
demand for goods from this country (see, e.g., Baier et al., 2014; Head and Mayer, 2014;
Kohl, 2014; Maggi, 2014). These studies typically employ a gravity equation to determine
the impact of trade agreements on gross trade flows. However, such studies do not account
for the problem of double counting in gross trade statistics, i.e., when the value of German
intermediate inputs used in Polish exports is ascribed to Poland, thereby overstating the
latter’s economic contribution. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to shed light on how
trade agreements shape their members’ value added trade.
Our central question is how reductions in trade costs influence a country’s Value Added
eXports (VAX)—which embody demand for the exporter’s factors of production such as
capital and labor throughout global value chains (GVCs)—and, in turn, how this translates
into higher relative demand for the production factors used intensively in production.
We will apply this framework to the case of the 2004 EU enlargement, which involved
intensive political debates about labor market impacts. Especially incumbents’ manufac-
turing workers feared competition from the new members’ low-skilled workforce.1
1In the European Social Survey 2004, low-skilled respondents from incumbent EU members were on
average rather reluctant towards further integration, whereas respondents with a higher level of education
were more positively inclined (NSD, 2004).
2
Hence, the main aim of this paper is threefold. First, to quantify and compare the effects
of the 2004 EU enlargement on gross and value added exports. Second, to investigate how
the demand for production factors has changed as a result of this enlargement. Third, to
analyse how these dynamics translate into employment effects.
Our paper is related to Noguera (2012), who estimated the effect of trade agreements on
trade in value added. However, we depart from his paper in two respects. We (i) focus on a
specific agreement and (ii) more importantly, disentangle the mechanisms linking European
integration with changes in members’ production structures and labor market outcomes. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates the effects of the EU enlargement on
trade in value added and on the embodied demand of production factors.
In this spirit, the paper aims to determine how the European integration process has
shaped economic fragmentation in Europe’s GVCs.2 The case of the Central and Eastern
European Countries’ (CEECs) accession to the EU is highly relevant when considering
supply-chain trade and trade policy, as increasingly more countries seek to form deep,
comprehensive trade agreements with trade partners immediately relevant for their supply
chains (e.g. Pacific Alliance, Transpacific Partnership, and Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership).
Our empirical strategy is to apply Baier and Bergstrand (2007)’s version of the gravity
equation—which accounts for both endogenous trade policy and phase-in effects over a
5-year period—to the World Input-Output Dataset (WIOD)’s time-series data on trade in
value added for 40 countries in the 1995-2009 period (Timmer et al., 2015).
We find that EU enlargement has primarily caused Eastern entrants to become more
integrated in value chains with other CEECs both in manufacturing and services. In the
case of EU15 countries, value-added exports to Eastern entrants increased in manufactur-
2Throughout this paper, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) will interchangeably be
referred to entrants, acceding countries and Eastern countries joining the European Union in 2004: Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The incum-
bent/Western countries are the EU15 members, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
3
ing, but not in services. In contrast, EU enlargement strengthened the entrants’ value added
exports to the West in services, but not in manufacturing. These exports in services are to
a large extent linked to low-skilled services, suggesting that enlargement has led to a de-
crease in labor-skill intensity of entrants’ service exports to the incumbents. Later, we also
apply the same framework to estimate how these integration processes translate into the
creation of jobs. Our results indicate that 2004’s accession led to a sizeable increase in jobs
for entrants, while incumbents faced neutral to positive labor market effects. Surprisingly,
skill-upgrading in entrants’ service industries is driven by demand from other Central and
Eastern European states.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures
on economic integration and economic fragmentation. The data and methodology are sub-
sequently presented in section 3. Our main results are presented in section 4 and sensitivity
analyses in section 5. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes.
2 Literature
Widespread industrialization and declining trade costs have given rise to an increase of
trade in intermediate goods (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990; Krugman and Venables, 1995;
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). As Baldwin (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
explain, internationally traded goods and services have become “unbundled” into interna-
tionally tradable jobs, tasks and skills. As a result, this phenomenon of economic frag-
mentation has caused the domestic value added share in gross exports to drop by 10-15
percentage points in the last four decades (Johnson, 2014).
Case studies on specific export goods described the partly surprising division between
gross trade and trade in value added. Influential examples are Dedrick et al.’s (2010) study
on portable devices and Dudenhöffer’s (2005) on the Porsche Cayenne. These studies
shed light on the different shares of value added that were captured by firms and nations.
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However, only specific tradable goods at one point in time were investigated, making it
impossible to draw in-depth conclusions about the nature of economic fragmentation, its
sectoral and factoral contributions and international trade policy. Yet, such data on the fac-
tor content of trade (e.g., capital and the skill levels of labor) are needed to assess national
competitiveness (Trefler and Zhu, 2010) and have only recently become available thanks to
comprehensive multi-country input-output tables (Timmer et al., 2015).
The novel data on value-added trade enables a re-assessment of trade theory and may
help prevent drawing misleading conclusions from research based on gross trade statis-
tics. Our focus here is especially on factoral specialization patterns due to trade integra-
tion. While specialization may arise due to Ricardian trade based on technological ad-
vantages, recent research suggests that Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) trade—endowment
driven specialization—is more relevant (Morrow, 2010; Egger et al., 2011). However, HOV
predictions performed ambiguously in past studies (Trefler, 1995). Particularly, the com-
mon assumption that all countries have a similar input-output structure (proxied by US-
technology) masked specialization patterns in previous studies (Schott, 2003). Our analysis
circumvents this limitation because WIOD relies on national input-output tables.
Following HOV predictions, we expect that trade integration will push CEECs to spe-
cialize in goods and services that intensively use their relatively abundant factors of pro-
duction, i.e., lower-skilled labor. In contrast, EU15 countries are expected to specialize
in goods and services that are intensive in capital and high-skilled labor. According to
Stehrer et al. (2012), advanced countries should be exporters of goods and services in-
tensive in high-skilled labor activities, and off-shore medium-skilled manufacturing jobs.
Today, increasingly more low- and medium-skill jobs seem to be sourced from abroad, so
that economies pursuing “catching-up” strategies may be expected to shift to higher value-
added activities. It is in this context that our paper focuses on the specific example of the
10 new member states, which acceded to the EU in 2004. In order to examine the effect of
trade integration on VAX and its composition, a more detailed understanding is needed of
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the mechanisms linking regional integration processes with changes in members’ produc-
tion structures.
The accession of CEECs was gradually phased-in and preferential liberalization already
took place partly within the framework of the Europe Agreements during the 1990s. More-
over, entrants liberalized economic exchange among themselves asymmetrically in either
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) or the Baltic Free Trade Agreement
(BAFTA) with different subsets of CEECs in either agreement. Although pre-2004 liberal-
ization lowers additional benefits of full membership as of 2004, the EU entry was expected
to give further impetus to the CEECs’ growth for the following reasons: Full EU member-
ship increased financial inflows due to political stabilization (Baldwin et al., 1997) and a
further reduction of trade frictions in terms of abolished border controls and product stan-
dard harmonization facilitated integration into value chains of the EU15 (Martinez-Zarzoso
et al., 2015).
3 Data & Methodology
This section describes the underlying data and outlines the empirical methodology used to
answer the main questions.
3.1 Data
Data on the factor content of trade in value added are from the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD, November 2013 release). The database covers 40 advanced and emerging coun-
tries, which is equivalent to approximately 85% of world GDP, and provides annual time-
series data for the 1995-2009 period for 14 manufacturing and 20 services industries (see
Timmer et al., 2015). The Appendix provides details about descriptive statistics (Table
A.1), country coverage (Table A.7) and industry coverage (Table A.8).
Our dependent variable of interest, VAX, is a measure of a country’s “domestic value
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added embodied in final expenditures abroad” (Timmer et al., 2015, p. 580). While Johnson
and Noguera (2012a) and Koopman et al. (2014) provide similar measures, there are differ-
ences in how these data are constructed. Johnson and Noguera (2012a)‘s Value Added mea-
sure builds on the seminal contribution of Leontief (1936), who introduced a framework
to describe the international Input-Output structure and follow up intermediate production
steps to the nth tier via the so-called Leontief inverse L. This is appealing in a fragmented
world economy as it reveals the VA contribution from domestic production steps in final
products, e.g., in terms of VAX from country a to b:
V AXab = va ⇤ L ⇤ db, (1)
where VAX is calculated by multiplying a vector of value added inputs of domestic sectors
va from country a with the international production structure exhibited by the Leontief in-
verse L. The product is then post-multiplied via the final demand vector in foreign country
b, db.
A major advantage of the data obtained from WIOD is that it provides a factoral de-
composition of VAX in terms of its capital and labor components. Moreover, the latter is
measured in terms of educational attainment, which makes it possible to identify special-
ization patterns in terms of low, medium and high-skilled labor. For this purpose the Value
Added vector, va, is pre-multiplied with a matrix of factoral weights, Fa, which describes
the input share of the respective factor.
When using these data, one has to consider that comprehensive databases like WIOD
have to build on partly strong assumptions. One of them is that the average production
structure in an industry is assumed to be constant for all products and all firms for details,
see Timmer et al., 2015. Firms that produce for the domestic market, however, differ sig-
nificantly from firms following internationalization patterns, as do their products (Helpman
et al., 2008; Altomonte et al., 2011).
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Figure 1 Composition of CEECs’ VAX to EU27
Note: Labor HS, MS and LS refer to high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled labor,
respectively. Source: Authors’ calculations based on WIOD.
Figure 1 displays the factoral decomposition of VAX from entrants to the EU in the
pre- and post-accession period for manufacturing and services. Service sectors’ VAX build
to a larger extent on capital and high-skilled labor. In contrast, CEECs’ manufacturers’
exporting to the EU27 have a higher medium-skilled labor intensity. Although capital and
high-skilled labor intensity in the post-accession period have increased in both sectors,
the changes differ in magnitude. The shift to a higher capital intensity is more marked
for manufacturing firms (6%), while the share of high-skilled labor has grown stronger in
service exports to the EU27 (4%).
3.2 Model Specification
We now proceed to determine, empirically, how European integration affects international
fragmentation. Drawing on the rich literature on the gravity equation of international trade3
3For surveys, see Head and Mayer (2014) and Kohl (2014).
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we employ a theoretically based log-linear gravity model that according to Anderson and
Wincoop (2003) should be estimated as:
ln(Eijt) =  1ln(Yit) +  2ln(Yjt) +  3ln(Dij) +  4EUijt   lnP 1  it   lnP 1  jt + ✏ijt, (2)
where Eijt is country i’s exports to country j in year t, Y is GDP, D is geographic distance,
EU a binary variable equal to 1 if the country-pair is in the EU and 0 otherwise, and ✏ is
the error term. As suggested by Anderson and Wincoop (2003) multilateral resistance—
e.g., to account for the relative trade costs vis-à-vis the rest of the world—is considered by
the terms  lnP 1  it and  lnP 1  jt .
Building on Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we control for time-varying multilateral re-
sistance terms by using exporter-year (Fit) and importer-year (Fjt) fixed effects. As is
well-known in the empirical trade literature, these fixed effects essentially capture all vari-
ables that vary by country-year, i.e., GDP, and time-varying multilateral resistance terms.
A further concern when assessing the effectiveness of trade agreements relates to the
potential endogeneity of these agreements. Trade policy might not be strictly exogenous
as well-informed policy makers take factors into account that influence trade already be-
fore the conclusion of the agreement. In the case of the Eastern EU enlargement, cultural
similarities between the accession states might have contributed both to the selection into
the agreement and increased trade levels ex ante by facilitating transactions. In a classical
cross-sectional gravity model point estimates would be biased (an issue discussed at length
in Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
One strategy to account for the biased estimate of endogenous trade agreements is by
adopting instrumental variables. Previous studies, however, obtained fragile results (Baier
and Bergstrand, 2002; Magee, 2003). For this reason, we will focus on a panel data model
in first differences (Magee, 2008) or alternatively with dyadic fixed effects (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007). Both are different ways to address time-invariant dyadic unobservables,
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i.e., geographic distance (Dij), common language or colonial history.4,5 This yields:
ln(Eijt) =  1EUijt +  itFit +  jtFjt +  ijFij + ✏ijt, (3)
or, in first-differences:
dln(Eij,t (t 1)) =  1dEUij,t (t 1) +  i,t (t 1)dFi,t (t 1)
+  j,t (t 1)dFj,t (t 1) + vij,t (t 1), (4)
assuming that vij,t (t 1) = ✏ijt   ✏ij,t 1 is white noise. Wooldridge’s (2002) test for serial
correlation, reported in Table A.2, rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in all
instances in which the fixed effects (Equation 3) are used. This is less of a concern for the
first-differences variant (Equation 4), which is the more efficient and our preferred alter-
native. A further advantage of first differencing is that stationarity of the data is induced,
which is especially important as trade flows can be assumed to follow a unit-root process.
Fixed effects by differencing around the mean would not account for this properly, thus,
potentially causing spurious regressions (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). In all cases, param-
eter estimates are obtained with country-pair clustered robust standard errors to mitigate
potential bias due to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 283).
Following the literature, we include lagged trade agreement terms to allow for “phase-
in effects” that capture integration effects materializing in the period following the de jure
accession in the concurrent year (i.e., 2004). Recall that WIOD provides data up to 2009,
so that our phase-in period is 5 years. Even though the literature by now suggests a phase-in
period of 10 years, the most significant part of the phase-in effects seems to be in the first 5
years post-enforcement (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, p. 89-91). At the very least, our
4For the period of observation the unobservables of interest --e.g., cultural differences or complementary
resource endowments—are assumed to be time-invariant or slow-moving.
5Note that regressing VAX on GDP would give rise to endogeneity because GDP measures domestic
value added. The fact that GDP is fully captured by country-time effects enables us to estimate a gravity
equation of trade in value added without the need to estimate parameters for GDP.
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results provide lower bound estimates of EU accession effects on (value-added) exports.
Altogether, this yields:
dln(Eij,t (t 1)) =  1dEUij,t (t 1) +  2dEUij,(t 1) (t 2) +  3dEUij,(t 2) (t 3)
+  4dEUij,(t 3) (t 4) +  5dEUij,(t 4) (t 5) +  6dEUij,(t 5) (t 6)
+  i,t (t 1)dFi,t (t 1) +  j,t (t 1)dFj,t (t 1) + vij,t (t 1). (5)
In addition to distinguishing between gross and VA exports, we are also interested in the
accession impacts at a factoral level. Therefore, Equation 5 is estimated in six models
with different dependent variables: (1) Gross Exports, (2) VA eXports (VAX), (3) VAX
attributable to capital, (4) to high-skilled labor, (5) medium-skilled labor and (6) low-skilled
labor.
As the latter factoral contributions are based on scaling the underlying VAX measure,
it can be assumed that the errors of the models with the dependent variables (3)-(6) are
correlated. For this reason, we will make use of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
model introduced by Zellner (1962), which allows for a non-zero covariance matrix be-
tween residuals. The model builds on a two step approach, in which the covariance matrix
of the stacked error terms of the related regressions is estimated in a first step. This covari-
ance matrix is then used in a subsequent step to obtain a consistent and unbiased estimator
via Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). Allowing for the correlation of residu-
als across models, we are able to compare coefficients of different regression models and
interpret changes in capital-labor and labor-skill ratios.
11
4 Results
4.1 Value Added eXports
Table 1 presents our estimates for Equation 5.6 Multicollinearity is not a concern because
all correlation coefficients are 0.2 (not reported). To save space, we do not report the
individual parameter estimates for each and every lagged trade agreement term. Instead, we
calculate the total Average Treatment Effect (ATE) as the sum of the significant coefficients
of the (lagged) trade agreement terms and report values from joint-significance tests for the
corresponding variables.
Table 1 Total Average Treatment Effects (ATEs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing 0.109 0.1179⇤⇤ 0.0921⇤ 0.1213⇤ 0.1294⇤⇤ 0.1316⇤⇤
(0.2515) (0.0077) (0.0364) (0.0156) (0.0079) (0.0057)
Services -0.288 0.0939⇤ 0.0730⇤ 0.1062 0.0905⇤ 0.0903⇤
(0.0818) (0.0263) (0.0281) (0.0628) (0.0127) (0.0168)
Notes: Estimates for Equation 5. The full version of this table is Table A.4 in the Appendix. Dependent
variables are reported in the second row. To save space, country-time fixed effects are not reported. p-values
of joint-significance of the coefficients in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
For the manufacturing sector, column (1) indicates that the accession led to an average
increase of gross exports among members by about 11.5%, which is however not statisti-
cally significant.7 In contrast, VAX (column 2) shows a positive effect of EU enlargement
of 12.5%. This effect can be decomposed by factoral contributions (column 3-6). We find
that the effect of EU enlargement for capital and high-skilled labor in VAX is lowest (9.6%
and 12.9%), and highest for medium- and low-skilled labor (13.81% and 14.1%).
For value-added trade in services, EU enlargement induced a significant and positive
6All estimates were obtained using the reg2hdfe user-written package in Stata 11, which significantly
reduces computation time with high-dimensional fixed effects (for details, see Carneiro et al., 2012).
7Estimates of percentage changes are for all estimations referring to the summation of baseline and
phase-in effects following (exp(baseline+ phaseins)  1) ⇤ 100%.
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ATE of 9.8% that can be attributed to capital (7.6%), medium-skilled labor (9.5%) and
low-skilled labor (9.5%). In contrast, VAX by high-skilled labor is not significantly af-
fected and, thus, a decline in the labor-skill ratio is suggested. Based on the results from
the seemingly unrelated regressions and the corresponding tests on equality of coefficients
across equations reported in Table A.3 this decline would be statistically significant.8
Our findings may be driven by economic and policy asymmetries between entrants
and incumbents, such as changes in entrants’ export structures. In order to examine these
changes in more detail, we add binary variables to Equation 5 so as to account for the
direction of trade, i.e., from entrants (CEECs) to incumbents (EU15), from entrants to
other entrants (intra-CEEC), and from incumbents to entrants.9
For manufacturing, the upper part of Table 2 shows that EU enlargement did not have
any significant effect on entrants’ gross exports to the EU15. Surprisingly, we also do
not find that accession generally affected value added exports when we account for global
fragmentation in columns (2-6). This is in contrast to our expectation that the CEECs
would become integrated in Western-European countries’ value chains once they accede
to the EU. This could be attributed to the asymmetric process of EU enlargement, which
already led in the 1990s to preferential liberalization of exports from aspirant entrants to
incumbents in the framework of the Europe Agreements.10
Interesting is our finding that EU accession brought about stronger regional integra-
tion among CEECs in terms of gross exports (43.6%).11 The estimated ATE for VAX is
slightly higher at 47.4% and driven by VAX of capital (32.8%) as well as low-skilled (32%),
medium-skilled (23.3%) and high-skilled labor (20.6%). Although coefficient sizes differ
8The decline in gross exports of services is not in line with our expectations and may be related to data
quality issues in WIOD. For services, inconsistencies and lack of data for all countries made it necessary to
take the average of use structures for all imported services across time and countries (Timmer, 2012).
9Results with a full set of (lagged) trade agreement terms are provided in Tables A.5-A.6.
10However, looking more closely at the results in Table A.5, significant lags for the year 2009 suggest
that five years might be a timeframe too short to capture the full accession impact on CEEC-EU15 trade.
11While the strong intra-CEEC effect of manufacturer’s gross exports is confirmed in Hornok (2010), note
that our studies are not comparable due to her usage of bi-annual data for 1999-2007 and exclusion of Cyprus,
Malta and Greece from the sample.
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Table 2 Total ATEs: Differential Accession Impacts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
CEEC!EU15 0.0000 0.0732 0.0772 0.0169 0.0197 0.0213
(0.6625) (0.2318) (0.9445) (0.9328) (0.9776) (0.9004
Intra-CEEC 0.362⇤⇤ 0.388⇤⇤⇤ 0.2839⇤⇤ 0.1869⇤ 0.2093⇤ 0.278⇤
(0.0088) (0.0000) (0.0049) (0.0420) (0.0260) (0.0235)
EU15!CEEC 0.269⇤⇤⇤ 0.0922⇤⇤⇤ 0.159⇤ 0.173 0.179⇤ 0.180⇤
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0417) (0.0530) (0.0336) (0.0336)
Services
CEEC!EU15 -0.461⇤ 0.1195⇤ 0.0003 -0.0201 0.0622⇤ 0.1218⇤
(0.0171) (0.0255) (0.1490) (0.3304) (0.0309) (0.0269)
Intra-CEEC -0.340 0.1340⇤⇤ 0.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.2169⇤⇤⇤ 0.2259⇤⇤⇤ 0.2287⇤⇤⇤
(0.4060) (0.0075) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)
EU15!CEEC 0.0000 0.1064 0.1220 0.0572 0.0976 0.0598
(0.4335) (0.1787) (0.0845) (0.2590) (0.1495) (0.2176)
Notes: Estimates for Equation 5. The full version of this table is Table A.5-A.6 in the Appendix. Dependent
variables are reported in the second row. p-values of joint-significance of the coefficients in parentheses. ⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
markedly, the SUR results suggest that only those of high- and medium-skilled labor are
significantly different (see Table A.3).
Turning to the trade effects for incumbents, we find positive effects for gross (30.9%)
and value added exports (9.7%) to new member states. VAX by capital increases by 17.2%.
Among the labor-skill types, the effects on medium- and low-skilled labor were 19.6% and
19.7% respectively.
For gross exports in services (lower part of Table 2), we do not find evidence of mean-
ingful accession effects for either incumbents or entrants.12 However, the CEECs’ contri-
bution to value added exports with the EU15 increased by 12.7%. This effect is attributed
12The significance of the ATE for service gross exports among CEECs and incumbents is surprising, yet
may be explained by the fact that “services” involve several, heterogeneous sectors.
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largely to low-skilled labor (13%), whereas medium-skilled labor is affected to a smaller
extent (6.4%). The results from the seemingly unrelated regressions support the notion
that enlargement fostered specifically low-skilled services exports to incumbents, which
contrasts pre-enlargement expectations of an increase of high-skilled exports in services
(Marin, 2004). Hence, accession had a depressing effect on the skill-structure of East-West
services exports.
As with manufacturing, EU enlargement had a positive effect on value-added trade in
services (14.3%) between entrants. Here, the gains range between 24.2% for high-skilled
labor and 28.8% for capital. However, the factoral ATEs are not significantly different.
Therefore, unlike for services exports among entrants and incumbents, no low-skill bias is
induced for East-East trade. Finally, the EU15’s (value added) exports in services to the
new member states were not significantly affected by the EU enlargement.
Taken together, we find that EU enlargement has mainly promoted the CEECs’ integra-
tion in regional value chains with other CEECs in both manufacturing and services, but not
with incumbent EU15 countries. In contrast to pre-enlargement expectations (Sinn, 2007),
accession did not increase entrants’ manufacturing (value added) exports to the incumbent
members. Yet, the CEECs exported more lower-skilled services to the incumbents after
2004. The enlargement has also increased the EU15’s (value added) exports of manufac-
tured goods to the CEECs, but not for services.
4.2 Labor Market Outcomes
In order to illustrate the implied labor market effects, we use the coefficients from Table 2
to derive the implied increases in jobs across European member states by estimating:
 Jij = jis ⇥ Lijs2004 ⇥ ATEij (v)
Based on the input-output accounting framework, we can pre-multiply the sectoral
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Input-Output for trade between partner i and j with a sectoral job vector js in order to
obtain the jobs, which are implicitly contained in sectoral exports.13 These are then post-
multiplied with the treatment effects ATEij obtained in Table 2.
Figure 2 Job Market Effects by Country
The implied job gains per EU member state are depicted as a fraction of total em-
ployment in Figure 2. While the incumbent economies experienced minor gains from EU
enlargement ranging to a maximum of 0.12% for Germany, the entrants benefit markedly.
Major gains of 3.65% job growth are found in Slovakia, whereby also the other Eastern Eu-
ropean nations exhibit markable increases of more than 1%. The smallest gains are found
for Cyprus, which may be explained by its remoteness from other Central European states.
13In order to calculate jobs, the Leontief inverse is pre-multiplied with a vector indicating the jobs per unit
of production in each sector. The underlying procedure is described in more detail in the Appendix.
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Figure 3 Job Market Effects by Country
Analogously to the main results, Figure 3 presents the implied labor market effects
of 2004s EU accession by trade direction. Interestingly, although relative increases in VA
exports by labor types were of comparable magnitude in Table 2, we find that absolute
job gains differ significantly. We find that medium-skilled jobs are increasingly offshored,
where the largest gains are across trade directions and sectors (see also Foster-McGregor
et al., 2013; Andersson et al., 2016). Substantial increases are found for intra-CEEC trade,
where the accession leads to an implied creation of 190,000 jobs in manufacturing and
80,000 jobs in services. Interestingly, service exports of the new member states to in-
cumbents contribute to the creation of additional 100,000 jobs, while—in contrast to pre-
enlargement expectations—the manufacturing sector remains unaffected. Note that we
only take into account demand effects of other EU25 member states, while not account-
ing for further potential gains associated to the integration in global value chains of partner
countries producing for African, American or Asian consumers.14
14These aspects are covered by other complementing studies. See, e.g., Timmer et al. (2013).
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5 Sensitivity Analyses
5.1 Endogeneity and Anticipation Effects
While our panel data approach already controls for endogeneity bias, an additional test
for strict exogeneity can be performed to ensure that our findings are not still somehow
subject to this bias. A lead term (in levels) is included in Equation 5 to ensure that the
assumption of strict exogeneity is not violated (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 283). This term
could also indicate possible “anticipation effects,” i.e., changes in trade flows prior to the
de jure enforcement of the trade agreement. A significant parameter estimate of the lead
trade agreement term indicates that it is correlated with the concurrent trade flow, so that
the model may still be subject to endogeneity bias.
Indeed, Table 3 shows one negative and statistically significant lead terms for VAX-
related exports in manufacturing. However, this tends to be very small (-1.5%). Moreover,
including these anticipation effects does not dramatically alter the size of the Total ATEs.
The coefficients are negative except for one case, suggesting a “delay” of trade integration
until de jure accession (a similar interpretation is given in Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, p.
90).
5.2 Prior Membership in BAFTA and CEFTA
Another potential concern is that the CEECs had formerly been integrated in regional in-
tegration initiatives, i.e., the Baltic Free Trade Area (BAFTA) and the Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Although the CEECs left these agreements upon their
EU accession, our EU accession variables may actually capture lagged effects of former
involvement in BAFTA and/or CEFTA.
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Table 3 Anticipation and Phase-In Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
EUij,t+5 -0.0320 -0.0151* -0.0115 -0.0126 -0.0127 -0.0121
(0.065) (0.015) (0.1883) (0.1260) (0.1240) (0.1430)
Total ATE 0.109 0.133** 0.115 0.1307* 0.1391* 0.14*
(0.2190) (0.0045) (0.0575) (0.0455) (0.0310) (0.0309)
Services
EUij,t+5 0.00507 -0.00663 -0.00387 -0.00652 -0.0103 -0.0134
(0.731) (0.257) (0.521) (0.440) (0.202) (0.104)
Total ATE -0.293 0.1398* 0.0768 0.0875 0.1407** 0.1574**
(0.2190) (0.0377) (0.0502) (0.1068) (0.0063) (0.0039)
Notes: Estimates for Equation 5 including lead term in levels (5 years). Dependent variables are reported in
the second row. p-values of joint-significance of the coefficients in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.001. The full version of this Table is available from the authors upon request.
In order to test whether it is not the de jure accession impact which is driving our
results, but rather pre-2004 liberalization in BAFTA/CEFTA, we re-estimate our model
with placebo accession effects. In doing so, we recode the EU dummy to indicate that EU
enlargement occurred in 2000, 2001, 2002 or 2003.
Table 4 shows that the Total ATEs are mostly insignificant if the accession is assumed
to have started in 2000, 2001, 2002 or 2003. Additionally, the parameter estimates are
dwarfed by the de jure accession effects of 2004 and can be mostly attributed to lags occur-
ring in the actual accession period.15 Therefore, we argue that the ATEs from Table 1 and
Table 2 can be specifically ascribed to the 2004 enlargement rather than to pre-accession
liberalization under BAFTA/CEFTA.
15For instance, the fifth lag of a 2000 placebo accession is in 2005, one year after the true EU accession.
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Table 4 Total ATEs for Placebos
Year Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
2004 0.109 0.1179⇤⇤ 0.0921 0.1056 0.1138 0.1317
(0.2515) (0.0077) (0.1654) (0.1897) (0.1275) (0.1113)
2003 0.109 0.0157** 0.0008 0.0265 0.0277 0.0294
(0.1553) (0.0048) (0.5923) (0.6450) (0.6938) (0.7348)
2002 0.109 0.0157** 0.0008 0.0265 0.0277 0.0294
(0.2012) (0.0059) (0.9030) (0.7634) (0.7122) (0.7709)
2001 0.109 0.0157** 0.0008 0.0265 0.0277 0.0294
(0.1957) (0.0059) (0.4311) (0.4580) (0.4014) (0.4188)
2000 -0.054 -0.0206** 0.0008 -0.0053 0.0277 0.0294
(0.0812) (0.0039) (0.6751) (0.7084) (0.6749) (0.6536)
Services
2004 -0.288 0.0939* 0.0730** 0.1062 0.0905* 0.0903
(0.0818) (0.0263) (0.0093) (0.0628) (0.0197) (0.0670)
2003 -0.288 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0468 -0.0008 -0.0053
(0.0986) (0.1344) (0.9985) (0.8988) (0.6469) (0.7621)
2002 0.0000 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0053
(0.8069) (0.0911) (0.1945) (0.1181) (0.0990) (0.2666)
2001 0.0000 0.0306** 0.0000 0.0403* -0.0008* 0.0663
(0.9685) (0.0458) (0.0738) (0.0172) (0.0325) (0.1462)
2000 0.0000 -0.0124* -0.0500 -0.0086 -0.0397 -0.0438
(0.7565) (0.0175) (0.9403) (0.5960) (0.6033) (0.9479)
Notes: Estimates for Equation 5 for different “placebo” years of entry. Dependent variables are reported in
the second row. p-values of joint-significance of the coefficients in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.001. The full version of this Table is available from the authors upon request.
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6 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper’s main objective is to assess the nature of the Eastern European enlargement
distinguishing between (i) gross and value added exports and (ii) putting a specific focus
on the factor content of trade at a sectoral and factoral level. Our results indicate that
while gross exports of manufacturers grew thanks to EU enlargement, it is not the case for
CEECs’ service providers. However, this result can be attributed to the fact that services are
used largely as inputs for manufacturing products (Timmer et al., 2013): Czech financial
services do not “cross the border,” but are implicitly embedded in Czech car parts destined
for export markets. Another explanation may be that the European internal market for
goods was already more liberalized than the market for services.16
Nevertheless, positive accession effects can be observed for both sectors when value
added exports (VAX) are taken as a preferred measure for trade flows, rather than gross
trade flows. Interestingly, the results indicate that EU enlargement has predominantly
caused new member states to become more integrated in regional value chains with other
Eastern entrants, rather than with the incumbent EU members. CEECs’ export focus on
the EU15 prior to enlargement and the relatively higher incomes of incumbents led to the
expectation that it is mainly the old member states’ demand that fosters gross and VAX
growth (Baldwin et al., 1997). In contrast, our paper’s results indicate that it is the demand
from new entrants that exerts a strong impulse. Our interpretation is that EU15 demand
was already close to its natural level due to pre-accession liberalization. In contrast, trade
among new EU members experienced further trade barrier reductions in the course of their
accession. Moreover, the CEECs’ post-enlargement demand (GDP) grew relatively faster
than in the EU15 (2.9% vs. 1.1% annually) (IMF, 2014). Thus, entrants seem to participate
less than expected in Western European value chains and there is no evidence for the es-
16For a draft of the EU directive on services in the internal market 2006/123/EG, European Commissioner
Bolkenstein proposed that services in the EU internal market be provided according to the laws of the service
provider’s country of origin. This triggered public concerns of social dumping in the context of Eastern
enlargement. The adopted version of the directive no longer contains this “country of origin” principle.
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tablishment of a hub-and-spoke structure between core and periphery (De Benedictis et al.,
2005).
One might assume path dependency of previous agreements that were established be-
tween the new member states prior to the EU accession. Notwithstanding, placebo tests
that assume EU enlargement would have taken place prior to 2004 indicate that there are
membership gains between old and new member states for CEECs that can be mainly as-
cribed to the 2004s accession. While the enlargement promoted manufacturing value added
exports from incumbents to entrants, there is no increase in the reversed direction. This is
due to the asymmetric nature of enlargement—while CEECs gained preferential access to
Western European markets before de iure integration in light of the Europe Agreements,
the tariffs of CEECs vis-à-vis incumbent exporters were only phased-out gradually in the
pre-enlargement period. In this regard, we do not find strong evidence for the suggested
competition between incumbents’ and entrants’ low-skilled manufacturing workers. If such
dynamics occurred, they would have mainly materialized in the pre-accession phase.17
Significant effects can be found, however, for Eastern service suppliers’ value added
exports to the EU15. In contrast to pre-enlargement accounts (Marin, 2004), CEEC entrants
gained most from contributing lower-skilled labor-intensive activities to EU15 members.
Hence, trade with incumbents had adverse effects on entrants’ labor-skill ratios rather than
inducing production upgrading processes in the acceding economies. An explanation for
this finding is that VAX of products with low skill intensity are disproportionately favored
by the reduction of trade impediments. Referring to Johnson and Noguera (2012b), goods
with a high domestic value added content “travel further” than goods with lower shares. On
the one hand, the goods with high domestic value added shares are on average the goods
involving high value added activities, related to capital and high-skill labor. On the other
hand, low value added shares in gross exports are attributable to production steps involving
low value adding activities associated with lower-skilled labor. If trade is liberalized and
17The small and mostly insignificant placebo effects in Table 4 suggest that strong dynamics before the
de iure accession are unlikely.
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barriers are reduced, traded tasks do not have to be that profitable anymore in order to justify
the trade costs—trade in low-skill tasks benefits relatively more from trade liberalization.
This effect is consequently larger, the further trade liberalization proceeds.
Applying these findings to the EU enlargement of 2004, the effect of economic integra-
tion can be perceived as relatively deep compared to global trade integration. Therefore,
in intra-EU trade relations, low value adding activities would be favored vis-á-vis trade of
EU members with other parts of the world. The result would be the previously found over-
proportional increase in low-skill value added exports from the CEECs to the EU. This is
not per se unfavorable for the CEECs if they continue increasing their absolute contribu-
tion of value added exports. Nevertheless, in the long run, new member states may need
to foster industrial upgrading processes regarding intra-EU trade, in order to avoid being
stuck with exclusively exporting low-skilled activities. This could also become especially
relevant when new countries competing in low- and medium-skilled labor sectors join the
EU in the future.
Our findings may be used as a stepping stone for future research to gain a more nu-
anced understanding of the economic effects of the CEECs’ accession by further decom-
posing data for the manufacturing and services sectors. The more general topic of economic
fragmentation and its sensitivity to trade policy offers various interesting fields for new em-
pirical work. First, recently announced updates of WIOD would make it possible to assess
the long-term impacts of accession. This is important in light of long-run phase-in effects
of trade agreements on trade Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Second, more comprehensive
data for larger country samples and more detailed factoral decompositions would be instru-
mental to assess the economic implications of a variety of trade agreements. This would be
especially helpful to obtain a better understanding of how trade policy shapes specialization
in an increasingly fragmented world economy.
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Descriptive statistics of gross exports, Value Added eXports (VAX) and the factoral de-
composition of VAX by capital and labor (skills) are presented in Table A.1. For each of
these variables of interest, a total of 23,400 observations were obtained from WIOD (15
years ⇥ 40 exporters ⇥ 39 potential importers). The highest share of non-positive values
was detected in gross exports of services (55 out of 23,400 observations, or 0.24%). Such
values may be attributed to negative changes in importing countries’ inventories. Overall,
zero ‘trade’ flows are not prevalent in the data.
Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics (in Millions of US$)
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev.
Manufacturing
(1) Gross Exports 2919.7 288.1 292331.7 0.00 11018.78
(2) VAX 1217.1 133.43 149851.3 -0.22 4733.7
(3) VAX by Capital 481.4 54.58 100421.1 -17.22 2211.7
(4) VAX by Labor HS 193.5 13.20 17567.9 -0.01 812.7
(5) VAX by Labor MS 378.4 33.56 36487.3 -0.01 1562.1
(6) VAX by Labor LS 163.8 16.16 24348.8 -.08 603.2
Services
(7) Gross Exports 837.2 86.7 90597.9 0.00 2781.3
(8) VAX 1405.4 179.7 128842.2 0.18 4717.0
(9) VAX by Capital 621.1 80.9 70668.5 0.04 2327.8
(10) VAX by Labor HS 282.0 28.4 20872.4 0.03 1008.0
(11) VAX by Labor MS 381.7 41.6 39208.0 0.03 1343.18
(12) VAX by Labor LS 120.6 14.8 8373.4 0.01 349.91
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WIOD.
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B Additional Results
Table A.2 Wooldridge (2002) Test for Autocorrelation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
FE 196.113 324.653 436.405 300.29 246.392 282.519
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FD 0.654 2.408 0.048 9.485 11.753 7.938
(0.4187) (0.1209) (0.8273) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0049)
Services
FE 547.768 1792.998 1380.092 1756.719 1693.634 1804.236
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FD 100.428 10.446 7.638 22.110 12.173 8.572
(0.0000) (0.1209) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Note: F-values, with p-values in parentheses.
Table A.3 Test for Coefficient Equality Based on Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Capital Labor HS Labor HS Labor MS
Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS Labor MS Labor LS Labor LS
Manufacturing
Overall Equality Equality Equality Inequality⇤ Equality Equality
(0.7941) (0.9266) (0.8441) (0.0322) (0.0881) (0.5248)
CEEC!EU15 Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality
(0.9868) (0.8703) (0.7523) (0.2772) (0.2107) (0.3502)
Intra-CEEC Equality Equality Equality Inequality⇤ Equality Equality
(0.1275) (0.2288) (0.2562) (0.0479) (0.1516) (0.7331)
EU15!CEEC Equality Equality Equality Equatlity Equality Equality
(0.7126) (0.9619) (0.9587) (0.0515) (0.2356) (0.9782)
Services
Overall Equality Equality Equality Inequality⇤ Equality Equality
(0.2007) (0.6573) (0.7663) (0.0322) (0.0606) (0.8478)
CEEC!EU15 Equality Equality Equality Inequality⇤⇤⇤ Inequality⇤ Equality
(0.4207) (0.1865) (0.1714) (0.0005) (0.0106) (0.7199)
Intra-CEEC Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality
(0.9555) (0.6810) (0.9743) (0.5979) (0.9752) (0.5100)
EU15!CEEC Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality Equality
(0.3059) (0.4879) (0.3437) (0.4281) (0.8720) (0.5248)
Note: p-values in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
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Table A.4 Full Lag Structure: Total Average Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
Accessionij,t (t 1) 0.109⇤⇤ 0.0671⇤⇤⇤ 0.0455⇤⇤ 0.0741⇤⇤⇤ 0.0777⇤⇤⇤ 0.0785⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.000) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Accessionij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.0380 -0.00897 0.0202 -0.0236 -0.0238 -0.0240
(0.280) (0.566) (0.288) (0.205) (0.202) (0.196)
Accessionij,(t 2) (t 3) -0.0209 -0.00674 -0.0138 -0.00185 0.00141 0.000273
(0.548) (0.694) (0.421) (0.923) (0.941) (0.989)
Accessionij,(t 3) (t 4) 0.00464 -0.0111 -0.0199 -0.00372 -0.00685 -0.00855
(0.912) (0.582) (0.326) (0.858) (0.742) (0.683)
Accessionij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.0281 -0.0150 -0.0127 -0.0177 -0.0160 -0.0121
(0.433) (0.421) (0.523) (0.341) (0.396) (0.523)
Accessionij,(t 5) (t 6) 0.0161 0.0508⇤⇤ 0.0466⇤⇤ 0.0472⇤⇤ 0.0518⇤⇤ 0.0532⇤⇤
(0.677) (0.015) (0.033) (0.029) (0.017) (0.013)
ATE: Accession Manufacturing 0.109 0.1179⇤⇤ 0.0921⇤ 0.1213⇤ 0.1294⇤⇤ 0.1316⇤⇤
(0.2515) (0.0077) (0.0364) (0.0156) (0.0079) (0.0057)
Services
Accessionij,t (t 1) 0.0184 0.0353⇤ 0.0316 0.0350⇤ 0.0401⇤ 0.0390⇤
(0.744) (0.082) (0.119) (0.089) (0.054) (0.070)
Accessionij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.00826 -0.00500 -0.00787 0.00395 0.00639 0.00414
(0.896) (0.817) (0.719) (0.867) (0.765) (0.850)
Accessionij,(t 2) (t 3) 0.0147 0.0261 0.0253 0.0317⇤ 0.0296 0.0269
(0.774) (0.146) (0.167) (0.099) (0.106) (0.162)
Accessionij,(t 3) (t 4) 0.0541 0.00611 0.00514 0.00501 0.00424 0.000661
(0.316) (0.742) (0.784) (0.812) (0.824) (0.972)
Accessionij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.288⇤⇤⇤ -0.0242 -0.0249 -0.0468 -0.0189 -0.0126
(0.001) (0.407) (0.398) (0.144) (0.509) (0.668)
Accessionij,(t 5) (t 6) -0.00662 0.0586⇤⇤⇤ 0.0730⇤⇤⇤ 0.0395⇤ 0.0504⇤⇤ 0.0513⇤⇤
(0.904) (0.005) (0.001) (0.055) (0.013) (0.027)
ATE: Accession Services -0.288 0.0939⇤ 0.0730⇤ 0.1062 0.0905⇤ 0.0903⇤
(0.0818) (0.0263) (0.0281) (0.0628) (0.0127) (0.0168)
N 21832 21838 21775 21838 21838 21838
R2 0.203 0.492 0.579 0.523 0.494 0.521
Notes: For each trade direction the ATEs refer to the summation of significant coefficients, which are also reported in Table 1. Robust
standard errors of the coefficients (clustered by country-pair) in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
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Table A.5 Full Lag Structure: Differential Accession Impacts for Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Manufacturing
CEEC!EU15ij,t (t 1) -0.0505 -0.0341 -0.0687⇤ -0.0576⇤ -0.0562⇤ -0.0557⇤
(0.430) (0.2480) (0.013) (0.0026) (0.031) (0.032)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.00579 0.0181 0.0772⇤⇤ 0.0304 0.0295 0.0296
(0.927) (0.4790) (0.005) (0.240) (0.256) (0.254)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 2) (t 3) -0.0988 -0.0342 -0.0531 -0.0476 -0.0452 -0.0467
(0.098) (0.2380) (0.0054) (0.065) (0.082) (0.071)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 3) (t 4) 0.0602 0.0176 0.00578 0.0783 0.00798 0.0836
(0.422) (0.6190) (0.833) (0.761) (0.758) (0.746)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.0420 -0.0144 -0.0140 -0.0128 -0.0103 -0.00464
(0.478) (0.6520) (0.61) (0.617) (0.691) (0.857)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 5) (t 6) 0.0434 0.0732⇤⇤ 0.0482 0.0745⇤⇤⇤ 0.0759⇤⇤⇤ 0.0770⇤⇤⇤
(0.490) (0.0270) (0.078) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.003)
ATE: CEEC!EU15 0.0000 0.0732 0.0772 0.0169 0.0197 0.0213
(0.6625) (0.2318) (0.9445) (0.9328) (0.9776) (0.9004)
Intra-CEECij,t (t 1) 0.362⇤⇤⇤ 0.263⇤⇤⇤ 0.219⇤⇤⇤ 0.239⇤⇤⇤ 0.246⇤⇤⇤ 0.247⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Intra-CEECij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.124 -0.0454 0.0438 -0.0192 -0.0190 -0.0196
(0.132) (0.256) (0.205) (0.553) (0.559) (0.547)
Intra-CEECij,(t 2) (t 3) -0.116 -0.0625 -0.0495 -0.0938⇤⇤⇤ -0.0886⇤⇤ -0.0900⇤⇤
(0.118) (0.110) (0.149) (0.0004) (0.006) (0.005)
Intra-CEECij,(t 3) (t 4) -0.0253 -0.0146 -0.0435 -0.00830 -0.0147 -0.0183
(0.765) (0.719) (0.204) (0.796) (0.0649) (0.570)
Intra-CEECij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.101 -0.0759 -0.0821⇤ -0.0693⇤ -0.0671⇤ -0.0623
(0.208) (0.0770) (0.016) (0.031) (0.037) (0.053)
Intra-CEECij,(t 5) (t 6) 0.0551 0.125⇤⇤ 0.147⇤⇤⇤ 0.111⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.476) (0.003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ATE: Intra-CEEC 0.362⇤⇤ 0.388⇤⇤⇤ 0.2839⇤⇤ 0.1869⇤ 0.2093⇤ 0.278⇤
(0.0088) (0.0000) (0.0049) (0.0420) (0.0260) (0.0235)
EU15!CEECij,t (t 1) 0.269⇤⇤⇤ 0.168⇤⇤⇤ 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.173⇤⇤⇤ 0.179⇤⇤⇤ 0.180⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EU15!CEECij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.0702 -0.0361⇤ -0.0360 -0.0388 -0.0383 -0.0389
(0.0860) (0.0500) (0.188) (0.130) (0.138) (0.131)
EU15!CEECij,(t 2) (t 3) 0.0569 0.0208 0.0249 0.0158 0.0199 0.0193
(0.1240) (0.2540) (0.363) (0.537) (0.440) (0.455)
EU15!CEECij,(t 3) (t 4) -0.0509 -0.0397⇤ -0.0456 -0.0267 -0.0332 -0.0369
(0.1750) (0.0360) (0.096) (0.298) (0.199) (0.152)
EU15!CEECij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.0143 -0.0157 -0.0115 -0.0226 -0.0217 -0.0196
(0.733) (0.423) (0.676) (0.379) (0.401) (0.447)
EU15!CEECij,(t 5) (t 6) -0.0111 0.0285 0.0449 0.0198 0.0276 0.0293
(0.808) (0.263) (0.101) (0.441) (0.284) (0.255)
ATE: EU15!CEEC 0.269⇤⇤⇤ 0.0922⇤⇤⇤ 0.159⇤ 0.173 0.179⇤ 0.180⇤
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0417) (0.0530) (0.0336) (0.0336)
N 21832 21838 21775 21838 21838 21838
R2 0.203 0.492 0.579 0.523 0.494 0.521
Notes: For each trade direction the ATEs refer to the summation of significant coefficients, which are also reported in Table 2. Robust
standard errors of the coefficients (clustered by country-pair) in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
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Table A.6 Full Lag Structure: Differential Accession Impacts for Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Value Added VAX by VAX by VAX by VAX by
Exports eXports (VAX) Capital Labor HS Labor MS Labor LS
Services
CEEC!EU15ij,t (t 1) 0.134 0.0182 0.0131 0.0128 0.0282 0.0182
(0.097) (0.525) (0.618) (0.630) (0.266) (0.483)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 1) (t 2) 0.0743 0.00714 0.00332 0.0120 0.0170 0.0264
(0.461) (0.829) (0.899) (0.651) (0.503) (0.309)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 2) (t 3) -0.0275 0.0565⇤ 0.0433 0.0684⇤ 0.0647⇤ 0.0607⇤
(0.720) (0.0350) (0.100) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 3) (t 4) 0.0786 0.0255 0.0329 0.0152 0.0267 0.0148
(0.317) (0.372) (0.211) (0.567) (0.293) (0.568)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.461⇤⇤⇤ -0.0702 -0.0736⇤ -0.0885⇤⇤ -0.0577⇤ -0.0406
(0.0000) (0.130) (0.005) (0.001) (0.0230) (0.118)
CEEC!EU15ij,(t 5) (t 6) 0.000877 0.0630⇤ 0.0739⇤⇤ 0.0434 0.0552⇤ 0.0611⇤
(0.9910) (0.034) (0.005) (0.102) (0.030) (0.019)
ATE: CEEC!EU15 -0.461⇤ 0.1195⇤ 0.0003 -0.0201 0.0622⇤ 0.1218⇤
(0.0171) (0.0255) (0.1490) (0.3304) (0.0309) (0.0269)
Intra-CEECij,t (t 1) 0.0250 0.105 0.0910⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.113⇤⇤⇤ 0.0947⇤⇤
(0.831) (0.057) (0.006) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.0030)
Intra-CEECij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.0459 0.0115 0.0137 0.0106 0.0298 0.0489
(0.695) (0.789) (0.676) (0.750) (0.348) (0.131)
Intra-CEECij,(t 2) (t 3) 0.0981 0.0385 0.0177 0.0629 0.0531 0.0470
(0.301) (0.334) (0.589) (0.058) (0.094) (0.147)
Intra-CEECij,(t 3) (t 4) -0.0322 -0.0142 -0.0219 -0.00439 -0.0210 -0.0351
(0.742) (0.721) (0.505) (0.895) (0.507) (0.279)
Intra-CEECij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.340⇤ 0.0116 0.0160 -0.00401 0.000870 -0.00970
(0.045) (0.860) (0.627) (0.904) (0.9780) (0.764)
Intra-CEECij,(t 5) (t 6) -0.0147 0.134⇤⇤ 0.162⇤⇤⇤ 0.0999⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.134⇤⇤⇤
(0.880) (0.003) (0.0000) (0.003) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ATE: Intra-CEEC -0.340 0.1340⇤⇤⇤ 0.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.2169⇤⇤⇤ 0.2259⇤⇤⇤ 0.2287⇤⇤⇤
(0.4060) (0.0075) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)
EU15!CEECij,t (t 1) -0.0979 0.0523⇤ 0.0500⇤ 0.0572⇤ 0.0520⇤ 0.0598⇤⇤
(0.202) (0.067) (0.057) (0.031) (0.040) (0.021)
EU15!CEECij,(t 1) (t 2) -0.0911 -0.0171 -0.0191 -0.00413 -0.00422 -0.0181
(0.225) (0.525) (0.469) (0.876) (0.868) (0.4850)
EU15!CEECij,(t 2) (t 3) 0.0570 -0.00434 0.00719 -0.00494 -0.00551 -0.00689
(0.353) (0.852) (0.785) (0.852) (0.828) (0.7910)
EU15!CEECij,(t 3) (t 4) 0.0293 -0.0133 -0.0227 -0.00518 -0.0182 -0.0135
(0.6620) (0.550) (0.389) (0.845) (0.473) (0.603)
EU15!CEECij,(t 4) (t 5) -0.115 0.0218 0.0237 -0.00503 0.0199 0.0154
(0.3530) (0.540) (0.368) (0.850) (0.4320) (0.553)
EU15!CEECij,(t 5) (t 6) -0.0142 0.0541⇤ 0.0720⇤⇤⇤ 0.0355 0.0456⇤ 0.0416
(0.8530) (0.0630) (0.006) (0.181) (0.0720) (0.1080)
ATE: EU15!CEEC 0.0000 0.1064 0.1220⇤ 0.0572 0.0976 0.0598
(0.4335) (0.1787) (0.0845) (0.2590) (0.1495) (0.2176)
N 21772 21840 21840 21840 21840 21840
R2 0.228 0.486 0.510 0.504 0.490 0.556
Notes: For each trade direction the ATEs refer to the summation of significant coefficients, which are also reported in Table 2. Robust
standard errors of the coefficients (clustered by country-pair) in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
C Estimating Value Added measures based on the World Input Out-
put Database
Leontief’s accounting framework is increasingly used in order to account for the fragmen-
tation of trade. Based on the so called Leontief inverse, it becomes possible to follow up the
n-th intermediate production step of a product and, hence, to trace back VA contributions
from different countries via an Input Output Table.
Figure A.1 shows a basic input output table. Like this table a World-Input-Output Table
(WIOT) contains a matrix Z of direct intermediate inputs for the production of goods for
final use F. While the columns of the intermediate use matrix Z describe the inputs for one
final demand unit of the respective sector, the rows describe the intermediate exports and the
use of domestic intermediate products of the respective countries. As production processes
usually not only involve intermediate inputs, but also the use of capital and labor, further
value is added. The latter is depicted by the vector of Value Added V. The columns of the
Final Use table F describe the domestic final demand for products worldwide, whereas the
rows describe worldwide final demand for domestic products. Summing up Z and F row
wise or Z and V column wise, yields the vector of world Ouptut X or X’ respectively. If we
divide the intermediate use matrix Z and the VA matrix V by the output matrix X, we derive
the matrix of direct inputs A and the matrix of VA-coefficients, thus, VA embodied v in one
output unit of vector X. However, the direct inputs for one output unit involve usually
further intermediate inputs. For instance, one unit of French transport equipment, might
need 0.3 units of British financial intermediation as an input. The latter might embody
Finish Pulp and Paper products as well as British Real Estate activities. Leontief (1936)
showed that it is possible to describe these input-structure until the n-th tier via the inverse
L = (I   A) 1 = I + A + A2 + ... + An. The Leontief approach makes it thus possible
not only to account for direct inputs, but for the indirect input structure of an economy.18
18Leontief already revealed in 1936 how important it is to account for the Input-Output structure of a
country in order to assess its competitive advantage. His seminal contribution on the paradox of the US’
capital-intensity in imports occupied economists for several decades (Leontief, 1953).
Figure A.1 Schematic World Input Output Table
An actual WIOT involves not only three regions, but 40 countries (plus the Rest of
World) with each 35 sectors, yielding 1435 world output sectors X(1435x1). The Interme-
diate Input matrix Z therefore has the structure of 1435 intermediate input sectors for 1435
intermediate goods (1435x1435). As WIOD distinguishes domestic final demands in five
different use categories per region (5* 41), the Final Use matrix’ dimension is 1435x205.
We now turn back to the initially described measure of VA from Lithuania (Country
A) embodied in exports to Finland (Country B). In this context we would like to calcu-
late Country A’s VA of products that are used directly and indirectly for the production
of Country A’s exports for Country B’s final demand. Describing Country A by the sub-
script a and Country B by the subscript b, the desired measure is now simply computed
as V AXab = va ⇤ L ⇤ fb, where va is the Value Added vector of the dimension (1x1435),
consisting of zeros, except from the 841th until 875th digit va(1, 841 : 875), describing
Country A’s VA-coefficients in the WIOD. The fb vector is a summation of the five columns
of the 1435 rows describing country B’s use of worldwide outputs F(1:1435,66:70). The
same framework is used to calculate the VA contribution of capital and labor inputs, by
accounting for the shares of capital and different labor skill levels in the sectoral VA.
Table A.7 Country Coverage of WIOD
Australia Brazil Canada China EU27
India Indonesia Japan Mexico South Korea
Russia Taiwan Turkey USA
Table A.8 Industry Coverage of WIOD
ISIC Rev. 3 Code Industry
AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
C Mining and quarrying
15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco
17t18 Textiles and textile products
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21t22 Pulp, paper, printing and publishing
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastics
26 Other non-metallic minerals
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal
29 Machinery, not elsewhere classified
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment
34t35 Transport equipment
36t37 Manufacturing, not elsewhere classified; recycling
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
50 Sale and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel
51 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
52 Retail trade and repair, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles




63 Other supporting transport activities
64 Post and telecommunications
J Financial intermediation
70 Real estate activities
71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal services
P Private households with employed persons
